— has a few connotations, most notably that everything
. Within the context of machine based consciousness, it can be limited and turned around.
Here are some of the most common connotations. (A little messy here, for now):
- Everything possesses consciousness (in the broadest sense of the word: everything) — This is the very high-level definition which is very well described (but not held) by David Chalmers. Everything here, includes things like "the number two."
- Consciousness is a state of matter — Just like liquid, gas, solid, plasma, are states of matter. This would seem to imply (jmo) that matter may, or may not, take up a state of consciousness, and that it may be in a conscious state, and not be in any other states.
- Consciousness is a fundamental characteristic of matter — Specifically, this is referred to as panprotopsychism, and an even more specific connotation is referred to as Russellian panprotopsychism. This can be thought of (loosely) as property dualism. These include characteristics like gravity, charge, mass, place, etc. These normally all exist simultaneously, as part of what makes matter, matter. For the record, this one seems most plausible to me. It comes from my own thesis that learning —entities not merely interacting, but adapting to each other— is ubiquitous, and that inter-adaptation can be observed, even between particles at the smallest scales. This is seen in the observer effect, for example.
- Consciousness is a mental state of matter — This is the thesis that fundamental particles, such as electrons, and quarks, might have a mental state, which is consciousness. This is called constitutive panpsychism.
As stated, I'm currently leaning to the camp that considers panpsychism's "fundamental characteristic"
connotation to be the most consistent with current understanding. In this connotation, panpsychism is described as the notion that consciousness is a fundamental characteristic of matter just as things like mass, gravity, and charge are characteristics of matter.
I would personally add that it may be a characteristic of matter, as well as
forces, or more succinctly, it may be a characteristic of volumetric phenomena (phenomena that take up, or exist in, multi-dimensional space).
. . . . . . .
This is just my own opinion. There is also the possibility that learning (i.e., adaptation) may be a fundamental property of consciousness. Learning, in this context, means an entity altering how it responds to a given stimulus in the future based on adaptive changes caused by current experiences. In this case, quantum interactions at the particle level, such as quantum entanglement, can be described as the lowest-level learning events, from which higher-level (macro) learning (adaptations) are all built. I would have referred to this as constitutive panspsychism if the name weren't already taken. :-)
. . . . . . .
Sources & Resources
- Panpsychism and Panprotopsychism
David Chalmers' writing on panpsychism. Clarifies the most literal (high-level) doctrine, but also states that most are not committed to such a strong interpretation.
- Consciousness Might Be a Result of Basic Physics, Say Researchers
It is surprisingly hard to explain the exact terms to describe the kind of panpsychism I (personally) find most plausible. This is a wordy article but includes yet another attempt at the explanation. It's about halfway down in the section entitled: A resonance theory of consciousness ("The panpsychist argues that consciousness did not emerge at some point during evolution. Rather, it's always associated with matter and vice versa – they're two sides of the same coin.")
- Physicists Say Consciousness Might Be a State of Matter
- Consciousness is just another state of matter, like a solid, liquid or gas, says physicist Max Tegmark
- Why Physicists Are Saying Consciousness Is A State Of Matter, Like a Solid, A Liquid Or A Gas
(no attribution, find better reference)
- [PDF]The Combination Problem for Panpsychism
In this paper, David Chalmers explores some of the objections to panpsychism.
- [PDF]The Knowledge Argument Against Dualism
This is a tangential objection and counter-argument to panprotopsychism. For the record, I am aware it spends a LOT of time pushing its straw-man, (substance-dualism) as a valid substitute for property dualism when analyzing the knowledge argument vis-a-vis dualism. For all its discussion, though, the justification for using substance dualism over property dualism never really emerges. It's surprisingly hard to find good counter-arguments to panprotopsychism right now. I promise to keep searching diligently. :)
- [PDF]Pessimism about Russellian Monism
Matter and energy turned out to be two different aspects of the same kind. So why can't phenomenal and physical also be two different aspects of the same kind? :)